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CHALLENGING FEDERALISM: HOW THE STATES’ LOUD
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVOCATION IS BEING MET WITH SILENCE
Jennifer M. Haidar†
“The peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The union
will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.”
–Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 80
“The fact that the Paris deal hamstrings the United States while empowering some
of the world’s top polluting countries should expel any doubt as to why foreign lobbyists should wish to keep our beautiful country tied up and bound down . . . That’s
not going to happen while I’m president, I’m sorry.”
–President Donald J. Trump
“Trump is AWOL, but California is on the field, ready for battle.”
–California Governor Jerry Brown

† J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019. The author is grateful for the editorial staff on the
Journal of Legislation for helping shape this Note with their detailed editing and insightful comments. Special
thanks to Professor Nicole Garnett and Professor William Kelley for providing an initial framework for this
paper. Lastly, the author would also like to thank her family, and her father George in particular, for their unwavering support.
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INTRODUCTION
In light of the recent political response to President Donald Trump’s decision to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement,1 a protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the legislation and political responses from several
states have called into question the stability of our federalist system. The United
States ratified the Paris Agreement on September 3, 2016 during the last months of
President Barack Obama’s presidency,2 and despite President Trump’s announcement to withdraw on June 1, 2017,3 the United States is nevertheless obligated to wait
three years to announce an intention to exit the agreement.4 Following President
Trump’s announcement, state legislators and politicians have passed unconstitutional
statutes and conducted foreign diplomacy in an attempt to constructively ratify the
Paris Agreement in spite of the federal government’s position.
This Note will not explore the merits of the Paris Agreement, because regardless
of the policy value of the agreement, the constitutional issue lies with the states’ unconstitutional response. By passing state legislation to uphold the Paris Agreement
and conducting diplomacy, states have violated the Supremacy Clause5 and the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power.6 These constitutional safeguards are in place because the American system of government relies on a stable balance of Federalism.
Though the states have reserved many powers, the power to sign treaties and conduct
diplomacy is not among them. By outlining how states have increased their disregard
for federalist checks on state power, this Note will be a helpful addition to the continuing scholarship on constitutional law. An analysis of intention and constitutionality will reveal that the laws passed in Hawaii, Washington, Massachusetts and Maryland go against our ingrained system of federalism and should be invalidated.
Furthermore, the actions of several political figures also unconstitutionally encroach
on the executive’s exclusive domain over diplomacy.
The United States Climate Alliance (the Alliance) is the embodiment of statelevel activism in favor of the Paris Agreement, and as a signal to the growing independence of states, they now count fifteen American states as part of their membership.7 Their mandate is to encourage legislation furthering the goals of the Paris
Agreement in spite of the federal position on the issue.8 Created as a reaction to the

1 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html.
2 Paris Agreement Status: Chapter XXVII Environment, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en.
3 Shear, supra note 1, at 1.
4 Paris Climate Agreement art. 28 opened for signature Dec. 12 2015, (entered into force Nov. 4,
2016). https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/270538.pdf.
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
7 About, U.S. CLIMATE ALL. (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.usclimatealliance.org/about-us/. (These
states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rice, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington.).
8 Alliance Principles, U.S. CLIMATE ALL. (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.usclimatealliance.org/allianceprinciples/.
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federal government’s announcement of withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,9 the
Alliance has been active in creating domestic support for climate change legislation,
practicing international diplomacy, and conducting foreign affairs. When state representatives gathered to speak in November 2017 at the Bonn Climate Conference, the
Alliance made a diplomatic appearance and was dubbed a “shadow delegation.”10 In
contrast to the American delegation’s booth advocating for the benefits of fossil fuels
and natural gas, the Alliance made various proclamations assuring our foreign partners that the individual states still support the Paris Agreement and will continue to
adhere to its provisions regardless of federal action.
Along with the Alliance, former New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Californian Governor Jerry Brown have launched another group advocating for the Paris
Agreement called America’s Pledge.11 After being asked about America’s Pledge,
Bloomberg announced that “we want the world to know: The U.S. will meet our Paris
commitment, and, through a partnership among American cities, states, and businesses, we will seek to remain part of the Paris Agreement process.”12 In contrast to
the constitutional separation of state and federal powers inherent in our federalist
system, Mr. Bloomberg’s comments are out of line and delve into the preempted field
of foreign affairs.13 The Alliance and America’s Pledge are very similar and both
advocate for large scale deviation from federal policy. While states have the power
to pledge themselves in favor of increased restrictions on environmental regulation,
the problem arises when they intermingle their domestic roles with foreign diplomacy.
This Note considers recent legislation, diplomatic action, and statements made
by state officials, and makes the primary contention that the environment in which
we find ourselves in tips dangerously towards a constitutional crisis. States have
been siphoning federal power without any pushback from the government, and based
on a historical review, the state actors in question have reacted with novel responses.
Incredibly, within the past fifty years the Supreme Court has only issued two opinions
regarding state action and the dormant foreign affairs power,14 so further contribution
to this field is sorely needed. In Part I, this Note will analyze the growing opposition
towards President Trump’s stance on the Paris Agreement. Next, in Part II, this Note
will argue that the foreign affairs power is solely the province of the federal government based on precedent and constitutional authority. Lastly, this Note will consider
whether states have encroached on this power in the past and distinguish cultural
connections with political statements.

9 Id.
10 Lisa Friedman, A Shadow Delegation Stalks the Official U.S. Team at Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/climate/un-climate-talks-bonn.html?_r=0.
11 About America’s Pledge, AM.’S PLEDGE, https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/about/.
12 Robinson Meyer, 'America's Pledge': Can States and Cities Really Address Climate Change? THE
ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/06/can-states-and-cities-reallycommit-to-the-paris-agreement/528945///.
13 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936).
14 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, Inc. v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
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I.CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
A. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION
Despite the merits of the Paris Agreement, state action intended to conflict with
federal foreign affairs power violates the basic tenets of federalism and the dormant
foreign affairs power. Bringing in many states, the pledges made within the Alliance
and America’s Pledge have inspired anti-federalist pieces of legislation. While states
have the power to legislate on climate change, they do not have the power to pair
those bills with statements of foreign policy. When President Trump announced the
American withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on June 1, 2017, he was speaking
for the entirety of the United States, not just the federal government.15 The federal
government has exclusive domain over foreign affairs, and while the states have the
power to pass bills addressing their individual emissions rates, they are nonetheless
barred by legislating in reference to international agreements.
On June 6, 2017, Hawaii made history as its legislature passed a bill explicitly
purporting to adopt the goals of the Paris Agreement.16 The language in the Hawaiian
bill is a provocative piece of legislation because it exists in direct contrast to the position of the administration and directly addresses issues of foreign affairs. Claiming
that “[r]egardless of federal action, the legislature supports the goals of the Paris
Agreement to combat climate change,”17 the Hawaiian legislature affirmatively outlined their position as contrary to the administration. Furthermore, the bill promises
to take up their fair “share of obligations within the expectations apportioned to the
United States in the Paris Agreement, regardless of federal action.”18
Similar to the situation in Hawaii, the Washington State Legislature also proposed a bill in the House on June 14, 2017, which claims to adopt the Paris Agreement.19 House Bill 2225 uses substantially similar language to the Hawaiian bill and
also notes that, “notwithstanding the June 1, 2017, [sic] announcement that the
United States would withdraw from the 2015 Paris climate agreement, Washington
state intends to fulfill its portion of the United States’ commitment . . .”20 The sponsor of the bill, Representative Vandana Slatter, commented that even though the federal government was being “shortsighted,” there was room for the states of Washington to lead and for all representatives to take action on a state level.21
Massachusetts has also disregarded the federal government’s exclusive claim to

15 Shear, supra note 1, at 1.
16 Merrit Kennedy, Hawaii Signs Legislation to Implement Goals Of Paris Climate Accord Anyway,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 7, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/07/531882630/hawaiisigns-legislation-to-implement-goals-of-paris-climate-accord-anyway.
17 S.B. 559, 2017 Leg., 29th Sess. (Haw. 2017), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2017/bills/SB559_CD1_.htm.
18 Id.
19 H.B. 2225, 65th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2017), https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=2225&Year=2017.
20 Id. at § 1, cl. 2.
21 Washington House Democrats, Slatter Introduces Legislation to Align Washington with 2015 Paris
Climate Agreement, WASH. H. DEMOCRATS (June 14, 2017), https://housedemocrats.wa.gov/press-releases/slatter-introduces-legislation-to-align-washington-with-2015-paris-climate-agreement/.
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set the national agenda for foreign policy. Introduced on November 1, 2017, the
House overwhelmingly voted to approve bill H 3994 which makes Massachusetts a
“non-party stakeholder” in the Paris Agreement.22 Upon initial glance, the term
“non-party stakeholder” seems to avoid explicit ratification of an agreement. Perhaps
the result of legal advice is to prevent incursion into the treaty power, but such an
analysis would miss the main point that the proposed bill is nonetheless an overreach
into foreign affairs and could still be enforced as a treaty. The bill’s definition of
“non–party stakeholder” gives room for cities and towns to adhere to the guidelines
of the Paris Agreement, and while the term “ratification” isn’t explicitly used, they
are still functionally adopting the Accords.23 While one State Senate representative
noted that the bill amounted to “running in place” on regulations aimed at decreasing
emissions,24 passage of the bill in both houses is not a requirement to be considered
an interference in foreign affairs.
Though Hawaii, Washington and Massachusetts all presented legislation to directly join or adhere to the Paris Agreement, Maryland’s legislation is unique because
it instead orders the Governor to join the Climate Alliance group founded by Governors Jerry Brown, Andrew Cuomo, and Jay Inslee.25 Introduced days apart in January
of 2018, the House26 and Senate27 bills both contained similar language requiring the
governor to include Maryland as a member in the Climate Alliance and prohibiting
the governor from terminating membership therein. As a result of such bicameral
consensus, Maryland Governor Larry Hogan sent out a letter to the Climate Alliance
outlining his commitment to participation and leadership with them.28 The letter also
mentioned Governor Hogan’s disagreement with President Trump’s decision to pull
out of the Paris Agreement and his hope of collaboration going forward.29 On May
15, 2018, the House bill passed and was signed into law by Governor Hogan, making
it the first direct order from a state legislative body to conduct foreign diplomacy.30

22 Katie Lannan, Mass. House Votes to Commit State to Goals of Paris Climate Accord, WBUR NEWS
(Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/news/2017/11/02/house-votes-climate-change-accord.
23 H.B. 3994, 2017 Leg., 190th Sess. § 2 (Mass. 2017),
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/190/H3994/BillHistory?pageNumber=1&direction=asc&sortColumn=BillHisto
ryDateTime.
24 Katie Lannan, Mass. House Votes to Commit State To Goals of Paris Climate Accord, WBUR NEWS
(Nov. 2, 2017) https://www.wbur.org/news/2017/11/02/house-votes-climate-change-accord.
25 Scott Dance, Maryland Will Join Alliance of States Supporting Paris Climate Agreement, Hogan
Says, BALT. SUN (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/environment/bs-md-hoganclimate-alliance-20180110-story.html.
26 H.B. 003, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MD/text/HB3/2018.
27 S.B. 0138, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2018RS/bills/sb/sb0138f.pdf.
28 Letter to the Executive Director of the U.S. Climate Alliance, Julie Cerqueira, on January 10, 2018,
BALT. SUN (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/environment/bal-document-hoganclimate-alliance-20180110-htmlstory.html.
29 Id.
30 H.B. 003, 2017 Leg., 437th Sess. (Md. 2017), https://legiscan.com/MD/text/HB3/2018.
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B. FOREIGN AGREEMENTS
Led by Governor Brown, California has been a major player in positioning itself
as an antagonist to federal climate policy. Following President Trump’s decision to
pull out of the Paris Agreement, the governor has increased foreign travel, diplomatic
meetings, and trade negotiations abroad.31 Governor Brown has heavily increased
California-China relations through signing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)
and frequent trips to Beijing.32 Generally, it is only presidents or secretaries of states
who take the role in signing Memoranda of Understanding. While these agreements
are not typically considered treaties or contracts in the common law, other law systems give them significant weight. A Chinese MOU in particular could be viewed as
legally binding, and considering that China has a civil law system, the idea of a good
faith negotiation would be equivalent to that of a contract.33 Binding or not, it is not
the role of governors to interfere with international relations and confuse foreign actors as to who has legitimate power to negotiate. From the perspective of a foreign
nation, discussing policy with conflicting representatives could be seen as strange at
best or could be used for a tactical diplomatic advantage at worst.
In what seemed to be a planned trip, days after President Trump announced that
the United States was pulling out of the Paris Agreement on June 1st, Governor
Brown flew to China the following Saturday to start a five-day diplomatic tour.34
While abroad, Governor Brown signed agreements with the cities of Beijing,
Chengdu, and Nanjing, launched a California-Haidian District Innovation Center,
and promoted his “Under2 Coalition” which seeks to join national and subnational
units of government around the world in the fight against climate change.35 In particular, the Under2 Coalition seeks international alliance in promoting the Paris
Agreement, and the conference was able to inspire five new members to join: Denmark, Indian state Chhattisgarh, the French region of Brittany, the South African
province of KawZulu-Natal and the South African province of Western Cape.36 The
Under2 Coalition has the same aims as the Climate Alliance and America’s Pledge,
and along with encouraging membership, Governor Brown was able to attract more
31 Stewart M. Patrick, California Seizes Climate Leadership After Trump Abandons Paris Accord,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog/california-seizes-climate-leadership-after-trump-abandons-paris-accord.
32 Memorandum of Understanding from Edmund G. Brown, Governor, State of California, on Establishing “China Provinces and U.S. California Joint Working Group on Trade and Investment Cooperation”, to
Zhou Shengxian, Minister of Environmental Protection, China (Apr. 10, 2013). http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/intergovernmental/MOU-Min_of_Commerce_China.pdf.
33 Dan Harris, Understanding a Chinese Memorandum of Understanding, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danharris/2016/08/30/understanding-a-chinese-memorandum-of-understanding/#ae71cbc7bf0b.
34 Jessica Meyers, Jerry Brown in China with a Climate Message to the World: Don't Follow America's Lead, L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-brown-china-20170607story.html.
35 Governor Brown to Expand California’s Climate Partnership with China in Chengdu, Nanjing and
Beijing, OFF. OF GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (June 2, 2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19821.
36 Governor Brown Opens Under2 Clean Energy Forum, Welcomes New Under2 Coalition Global
Ambassador Christiana Figueres, EAST VALLEY TIMES (June 8, 2017), http://evalleytimes.com/news/governor-brown-opens-under2-clean-energy-forum-welcomes-new-under2-coalition-global-ambassador-christianafigueres/.
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attention to his causes with these meetings.
Referencing Governor Brown’s Under2 Coalition, the chief director of environmental sustainability from the Western Cape claimed that it was encouraging to hear
“. . . that the voice of America is lots of voices and that they differ and that they’re
not the same voices coming out of the White House.”37 While this may be viewed as
a positive development for other nations if they disagree with American policy, it is
surely a detriment to our system of government when we no longer speak with one
voice. Public perception of Governor Brown’s trip has been observant of a strong
rift between the states and their federal government. The Los Angeles Times called
Brown’s trip a “diplomatic coup” because compared to Energy Secretary Rick
Perry’s minimal contribution to the Clean Energy Forum in Beijing, Governor Brown
was holding productive and extended meetings with President Xi Jinping.38

C. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND EVENTS
A. CALIFORNIA
Governor Brown has been the most active state governor when it comes to foreign travel and funded in part by non-profits like the Climate Registry and Climate
Action Reserve,39 he has used his resources to travel to China, Russia, the Vatican,
and the European Union. Along with signing agreements in China, he also gave a
lecture at Tsinghua University promoting the necessary academic contributions to
climate science and the need for young people to rise to the responsibility.40 More
importantly, this Note does not seek to analyze Governor Brown’s criticism of the
Trump administration, which he is well within his rights to do, but rather to criticize
his promotion of a foreign treaty. In the speech to Tsinghua, he mentioned the need
to stand up for the goals of the Paris Agreement and his intention to persuade other
states to adhere to their commitments.41
Following his tour in China, Governor Brown also went to Vladivostok, Russia
for the third annual Eastern Economic Forum to discuss collaboration.42 He spoke at
a panel titled “The Russia-China-Japan-U.S. Quadrangle: Are There Opportunities
for Cooperation?” and made a statement to Russian news organization RT that he

37 Jessica Meyers, China Is Now Looking To California – Not Trump – To Help Lead The Fight
Against Climate Change, LA TIMES (Jun. 6, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-globalclimate-20170606-story.html.
38 Id.
39 Gov. Brown Heads to Europe for Climate Talks, CBS SACRAMENTO (Oct. 31, 2017, 2:06 PM),
http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2017/10/31/climate-change-jerry-brown-europe/.
40 China Day 5: Governor Brown Closes California-China Climate Mission with Call to Action: “It’s
Not a Time for Inertia, It’s a Time for Radical Change,” OFF. OF GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (June 8,
2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19834.
41 Id.
42 Governor Brown to Attend Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok Next Week, OFF. OF GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19926.
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was looking to pioneer a “positive path” with Russia despite the economic sanctions.43 In an effort to understand Governor Brown’s intentions in travelling to Russia, Pravda, a pro-government Russian newspaper, made the observation that California and Texas often make a point of “flaunting their disobedience” with the federal
government.44 Creating a reputation for our states as rogue actors makes it difficult
for American allies and foreign counterparts to take negotiations seriously.
Accompanied by U.S. House Representative Scott Peters, Governor Brown also
led a delegation to the Vatican to discuss climate change policy.45 Attending the
conference days before the U.S. ambassador to the Vatican arrived, Brown urged
Vatican officials to continue their support of climate science and emissions regulation. Along with his encouragement to continue international collaboration, Governor Brown also used that forum to criticize the administration’s policy by stating that
President Trump doesn’t reflect the opinions of the majority of Americans regarding
climate change and that the administration has created an absurd situation in American public life.46 Criticism of the government is a healthy American pastime, but it
should not interfere with foreign affairs when the speaker holds public office and is
acting in an official capacity.
The Vatican trip was part of a larger 10-day European tour in November 2017
which included addresses to the President of the European Parliament, press conferences, and meetings with scientists.47 After Governor Brown’s efforts in Brussels to
create a framework for a common carbon market with Europe and China, the president of the European Parliament said that, “[t]he approach of Mr. Trump at a global
level is not necessarily as helpful as it might be. But we are delighted to have Gov.
Brown here because it shows there is a strong commitment from the U.S.”48 That
same day Governor Brown traveled to Stuggart, Germany to address the BadenWuerttemberg state assembly and argued that the world is looking to California for
leadership on climate change. He vowed that the United States would eventually sign
on to the Paris Agreement and that “[t]he States are coming back.”49
Meeting with Norway’s Prime Minister Erna Solberg, Governor Brown was
43 Relations between US & Russia Can Get 'Much Better' – California Governor to RT, RT
(Sept. 7, 2017, 4:40 PM), https://www.rt.com/usa/402221-us-russia-california-governor/.
44 Alexander Artamonov, Трампу Nередали "привет" с Дальнего Востока [Trump Was Given a
“Hello” From the Far East], PRAVDA.RU (July 9, 2017), https://www.pravda.ru/authored/07-092017/1347820-brown-0/.
45 Michael J. O’Loughlin, Gov. Jerry Brown Urges Religious Leaders to Fight Climate Change at Vatican Conference, AM. MAG. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2017/11/06/gov-jerry-brown-urges-religious-leaders-fight-climate-change-vatican.
46 Chris Collins, California Governor Uses Vatican Conference to Attack Trump on Climate Change,
CRUX (Nov. 5, 2017), https://cruxnow.com/vatican/2017/11/05/california-governor-uses-vatican-conferenceattack-trump-climate-change/.
47 Chris Megerian, Gov. Jerry Brown Plans Climate Trip to Vatican, Belgium, Norway and Germany,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updatesjerry-brown-europe-climate-1509478272-htmlstory.html.
48 Catherine Stupp, Gov. Jerry Brown and European Union Leaders Agree to Work to Combat Climate
Change, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-brussels-eu-jerry-brown20171107-story.html.
49 Natasha Bach, Hailed As the 'Anti-Trump,' California Governor Jerry Brown Delivers a Blunt Climate Change Message in Germany, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/09/jerry-browngovernor-climate-change-trump/.
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able to discuss climate goals with a fellow member of the Under2 initiative and participate in a round table of scientists and policy experts.50 Considering that membership in Under2 outlines future collaboration and agreements going forward, this
meeting with Prime Minister Solberg would have been considered a diplomatic visit
with an ally if Governor Brown had been acting as a president. As it stands, Governor
Brown’s visit to Oslo primarily revolved around recent scientific studies and evidence of climate change strategies.51 The meeting with the Prime Minister at the
official residence was a policy meeting about energy policy and set the tone for the
rest of the visit.52 When state actors attempt to shape federal policy, they violate the
Constitution by stepping out of bounds. Governor Brown’s visit would have been
normal for a representative of the State Department, but as a state governor, his actions have confused foreign powers and left federal diplomatic staff at a terrible disadvantage.
B. U.N BONN CONFERENCE
While diplomatic intervention from state-level actors is problematic when
viewed on a case-by-case basis, challenges to federal power becomes more apparent
when unlawful intervention is formally accepted by international actors. State activism reached a high point during the United Nations climate conference in Bonn, Germany when two American delegations attended to present opposing viewpoints on
how to solve the climate crisis.53 While the Trump administration sent in a team of
negotiators to the conference,54 a separate delegation composed of American governors, mayors, and state senators also arrived to advocate in favor of the Paris Agreement.55 This conference was meant to be attended by foreign dignitaries with agency
power from their respective nation-states, but with two delegations in attendance, the
United States presented the world with a split-level offer of diplomacy.
The state-led delegation was, unsurprisingly, led by California Governor Jerry
Brown. As the primary stakeholder in several of the state activist groups mentioned
earlier in this Note, Governor Brown has been one of the most outspoken critics of
federal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. Prior to the conference, Governor
Brown was appointed by the U.N. conference president, Fiji’s Prime Minister Frank
50 Governor Brown Meets with Norway's Prime Minister, Convenes First-of-its-Kind Gathering of
World's Scientific Academies, OFF. OF GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=20060.
51 Id.
52 Thomas Eckhoff, Governor Brown Meets with Norway's Prime Minister, HIGHLAND COMMUNITY
NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017), http://www.highlandnews.net/news/political/governor-brown-meets-with-norway-sprime-minister/article_b6117dba-c66e-11e7-a0d0-67bf6554289b.html.
53 Friedman, supra note 10.
54 Dave Keating, There Are Two Rival U.S. Delegations at the Bonn Climate Summit. Which One
Speaks for America?, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2017/11/06/thereare-two-rival-u-s-delegations-at-the-bonn-climate-summit-which-one-speaks-for-america/#346834bc1e96.
55 See Friedman, supra note 10.; See also, Fiji's Prime Minister and Incoming Cop 23 President Joins
Under2 Coalition, Appoints California Governor Brown Special Advisor for States and Regions Ahead of Cop
23, OFF. OF GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (June 13, 2017), https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=19845 (Noting that members attending the Bonn Summit also include Washington Governor Jay Inslee and Oregon Governor Kate Brown).
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Bainimarama, to be a “special advisor for states and regions that have assumed an
increasingly important role after Trump’s vow to leave the Paris Accord.”56 This
appointment served as a formal recognition in the shift of power within American
foreign policy.
The New York Times called the state-led delegation the “shadow delegation,”57
and the appearance of both groups prompted confused reactions to the dual American
representation from foreign delegates at the conference. However, some officials
preferred to ignore the official delegation entirely in favor of the shadow delegation.
One policy expert from the Union of Concerned Scientists made the claim that the
world should listen to the unofficial delegation instead of the party led by the American government because they “truly represent the interests of Americans, they are
closer to public opinion on this.”58 The shadow delegation set up a “US Climate
Action Center” which served as a pavilion at the conference to share their views and
climate priorities.59 At the opening of the pavilion, state senator Ricardo Lara mentioned that “[d]espite what happens in DC, we’re still here.”60
II. DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER & FEDERALISM
While the foreign affairs power is an implied constitutional power of the federal
government, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that this power is exclusive to
the executive and that it “cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the
part of the several states.”61 Moreover, the Court’s jurisprudence on the subject has
reasoned that the President is specifically and uniquely empowered to conduct foreign affairs.62 Having established that federal preemption is judged in relation between state action and executive decision-making, it becomes imperative to establish
what a showing of executive action means in the context of foreign affairs. In the
landmark case, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Supreme Court
invalidated a California law requiring foreign insurance companies to disclose their
records with the aim of compensating victims of the Holocaust.63 Garamendi represented an expansion of previous case law64 wherein state laws were only invalidated
if they conflicted with executive actions that had the force of law like treaties and
executive agreements with preemption clauses.65 Now, state legislation will be
56 Erik Kirschbaum, California Gov. Jerry Brown Delivers a Blunt Climate Change Message in Germany, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-germany-jerry-brown-climatechange-20171108-story.html.
57 Friedman, supra note 10.
58 Keating, supra note 54.
59 Oliver Milman and Jonathan Watts, One Nation, Two Tribes: Opposing Visions of US Climate Role
on Show in Bonn, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/09/bonn-climate-change-talks-us-two-tribes.
60 Id.
61 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936)).
62 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319.
63 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
64 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
65 Leanne M. Wilson, The Fate of The Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause After Garamendi and
Crosby, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 746, 763 (2007).
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preempted if it conflicts with an expressly stated foreign policy objective of the executive.66
This section of the Note will serve to provide a detailed background of the jurisprudence and precedent surrounding the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the Supreme Court’s historic balance of federalism. Though there is a dearth of opinions
on this matter, with state challenges to federal power on the rise, it is likely that the
Supreme Court will bring the matter to review once more if states continue to legislate and interfere with foreign affairs.
A. CROSBY V. NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL
In the first dormant foreign affairs case examined by the Supreme Court, Crosby
v. National Foreign Trade Council,67 we saw that a state law in Massachusetts limiting business with Burma was an unconstitutional use of state power. The Massachusetts legislature wanted to place regulations on products from Burma because of ideological differences resulting in a ten percent mark-up for blacklisted companies
competing for government contracts. If these particular companies still conducted
business with Burma, Massachusetts had the ability to sanction them in order to have
a subsidiary effect on Burmese business.
Months later, Congress passed its own sanctions bill on Burma and directed the
Treasury Secretary to deny loans, entry visas, and put a hold on foreign direct investment until there were measurable improvements on human rights enforcement and
democratic ideals. However, Crosby established that even if the executive agrees
with the state, it ruins the “one voice” concept. Here the Court made the decision
that the state legislation interfered with diplomacy because the President’s negotiating power is diminished when there emerges the possibility that enclaves within the
country will not adhere to the international agreement. The Court observed that “the
state Act stands as an obstacle in addressing the congressional obligation to devise a
comprehensive, multilateral strategy.”68
By using Crosby’s “obstacles conflict” preemption, we can make the reasonable
conclusion that the legislation passed in favor of adopting the policies of the Paris
Agreement would serve as an obstacle to the current administration. With a particular
eye towards the ability of the President to negotiate, such statutes effectively wipe
out any bargaining power to negotiate our way back in to the Paris Agreement. Regardless of whether or not a renegotiation is good policy, President Trump has no
bargaining power if the top economies within the state are already signed on in spirit
if not in pen. California, the biggest actor in promoting the Climate Alliance and
diplomacy, has the largest economy of all the states and would have the seventh largest economy in the world if it was its own nation. What would there be left to bargain
with once compliance with the Paris Agreement has marked the most economically
significant states?
66 Todd Steigman, Lowering the Bar: Invalidation of State Laws Affecting Foreign Affairs Under the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power After American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L.
465, 475 (2004).
67 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
68 Id. at 385.
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B. AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION V. GARAMENDI
In another dormant foreign affairs case, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, a California law was struck down because it was judged to limit the ability
of the executive to speak with “one voice.”69 The state tried to regulate insurance
reparations for stolen property after World War II, and even though both the state and
the federal government were in agreement that the predominately Jewish plaintiffs
should get their property back, the state action was still in conflict with federal (executive) negotiations. Even though the Supreme Court in Garamendi conceded that
the states traditionally had the power to regulate estate law, they nonetheless ruled
against the Californian statute because they determined the statute had a “direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the central
government.”70
Garamendi changed the way preemption was enforced because it struck down a
statute in the absence of any conflicting treaty or law.71 There, the only conflict was
between a California statute claiming reparations and the likelihood that the State
was disturbing foreign relations. The federal government was engaged in active negotiations over reparations to the Jewish people, and one of the very first concessions
received was that there would be no supplementary legal action.72 Even though the
American government didn’t agree to any future claims, the Court nevertheless said
that it was an infringement on foreign policy. Justice Souter came forward with a
balancing test in the majority opinion and wrote that: [I]t would be reasonable to
consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice,
when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law
preempted.”73
When you have states separate from the country to try and create their own foreign policy, it undermines the effectiveness of the country as a whole. Before Garamendi, it is likely that current events would not have met the threshold for a cause of
action for federal preemption. There is no treaty or federal law in conflict with the
legislation passed in Hawaii, Washington, Massachusetts, and Maryland, and the diplomatic outreach conducted by Governor Brown has been met primarily with silence.
The executive has not passed any laws regarding the Paris Agreement and despite his
open comments on the treaty, he has not issued any executive agreements. In the
past, the courts have even upheld divestment movements with the express approval
of the executive branch.74
After Garamendi, the question becomes: is there a sufficient foreign policy interest? It seems that the facts of the case in Garamendi create a very low bar for

69 539 U.S. at 442.
70 Steigman, supra note 66, at 469 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (2005)).
71 Steigman, supra note 66, at 476.
72 See id. at 474–75.
73 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420.
74 See generally Elizabeth Trachy, Comment, State & Local Economic Sanctions: The Constitutionality
of New York's Divestment Actions and the Sudan Accountability & Divestment Act of 2007, 74 ALB. L. REV.
1019 (2011).
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preemption. The statute did not contain any language adverse to the federal government or even intended to operate on the level of foreign policy.75 It only regulated
business in California and did not “require any inquiry into the policies of any foreign
government.”76 Knowing that the state was not intending to conduct foreign relations, the Court invalidated the statute solely on the basis that it “limited the ability
of the government to speak with ‘one voice’ in foreign affairs.”77
These pieces of legislation could also be invalidated on the basis that they interfere with foreign policy interests regardless of whether or not it is seen as diplomacy.
In the past, the government needed an official statute to claim a foreign policy interest, but with Garamendi, mere statements of interest or policy are sufficient to stake
a claim for interference. Taking into consideration President Trump’s statements on
the Paris Agreement, the status of the United States as a signatory on the protocol,
and the current political relevance, it would be hard to deny that this is a significant
foreign policy interest of the executive branch.
In the current political situation, the associations of states, cities, and counties
who wish to adopt the Paris Agreement are acting above and beyond the relatively
neutral statute outlined in Garamendi. By contrast, they directly note in their pieces
of legislation that they are acting contrary to the federal government’s foreign policy
and seek to establish independent connections with other nations. Taking for example Hawaii’s bill on adopting the Paris Climate Agreement, we see that the Hawaiian
legislature affirmatively entered into the sphere of foreign policy by naming the
treaty. In fact, Hawaii, Washington, and Massachusetts all passed legislation with
the intention to adopt the emissions policies outlined in the Paris Climate Agreement.
With language explicitly acknowledging that they are going against the expressed
view of the president’s foreign policy, their legislation is likely unconstitutional.
Maryland’s piece of legislation presents a different sort of problem regarding the
ability of states to conduct diplomacy on their own. Instead of using the statute to
adopt the policies of the Paris Agreement, the Maryland legislature solely forced
Governor Larry Hogan into signing on as a member to the American Climate Alliance led by Governor Jerry Brown. However, membership in the Climate Alliance
by implication means that the state, county, or city is making a commitment to adopt
the policies outlined in the Paris Agreement. The difference is that Maryland has
made their commitment through membership in an organization rather than through
legislation.
Regarding the legislation to adopt the tenets of the Paris Agreement, adopting
the balancing test outlined by Justice Souter would result in an affirmative claim of
preemption. The administration has been clear that they consider the Paris Agreement to be an issue they consider important regardless of whether or not they are
members. President Trump has had many press conferences, tweets, and statements
regarding the Paris Agreement, so such a volume of attention would suggest that the
topic held some priority in the administration. While there has not been an official
pushback towards the states undertaking these actions, unofficially, the media has
75 See Steigman, supra note 66, at 475.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 478.
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reported that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Scott Pruitt,
was considering an impromptu trip to the Bonn Summit following reports of a
“shadow delegation.”78
Even the name of the alternative delegation, “We Are Still In” suggests that states
have the power to agree to policy without the support of the federal government.79
When President Trump announced that the United States was pulling out of the Paris
Agreement, governors and legislators across the country immediately responded with
their own supplementary plans. This suggests premeditation in a general resolve for
our subnational units to break away from the “one voice” policy that has been in place
since the time of the Founding Fathers. Despite the representations that the states
have made, they do not have the ability to conduct foreign policy, either individually
or collectively in groups.
Examples of how foreign policy has been affected abound in the numerous articles detailing confusion over the American position on climate change. The confusion is so pronounced that some policy experts have suggested that the European
Union ignore the policy claims made by the federal government.80 Dueling political
contingents went to the Bonn Summit, and as a result of months of tireless diplomacy,
European attendees preferred to work with the non-official delegation led by Governor Jerry Brown of California. Likely the result of an international tour promoting
the Paris Agreement, Governor Brown positioned the “We Are Still In” delegation
as a favorable alternative to the negativity of the Trump Administration. This shift
away from working with the federal government as a representative of the United
States is significant. The transfer of foreign affairs power is non-delegable. Further,
considering the enormous impact that these states have made on the ability of the
federal government to conduct foreign affairs, there should be no question that there
have been negative repercussions.
While the strength of the state interest is very high when it comes to regulating
carbon emissions, it is doubtful that the Court in Garamendi would disagree with the
observation that the states could have legislated for restrictions twice as high as those
outlined in the Paris Agreement without jeopardizing American foreign policy. It is
one thing to legislate to set higher regulations, and it is altogether another thing to
legislate in direct response to treaties and foreign policy. As it stands, there is a
wealth of legal literature outlining the preemption questions when states legislate for
environmental controls instead of the federal government.81 An illustrative example
would be California’s stringent regulations regarding auto emissions. The federal
government allowed a “dual system of control” as long as the Environmental Protection Agency had the power to approve the standards as necessary “to meet serious air
quality problems.”82 The increased regulation propagated by California also served

78 Keating, supra note 54.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See generally Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111 (2015).
82 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Law in the United States and the European Community: Spillovers, Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 41, 60 (1992).
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to encourage innovation in the technology surrounding automobile manufacturing.83
C. UNITED STATES V. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORP.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Supreme Court in that case
ruled that there was a complete preemption of federal executive power in foreign
affairs.84 The facts in that case revolved around the ability of the President to ban
certain types of arm sales.85 The Court held that the President has almost complete
authority to shape foreign affairs and diplomacy without interference even though
the Constitution does not address the foreign affairs power of the President.86 The
executive’s exclusive power to conduct foreign affairs predates the Constitution and
was actually passed down from “Great Britain to the United States as a corporate
entity by virtue of the law of nations.”87 This argument sometimes doesn’t sit well
with strict originalists and textualists who look to the Constitution as an end-all-beall for our system of government, but let the reader also recall that the Constitution
does not explicitly outline the idea of separation of powers which we heavily rely on.
This idea is only logically deduced from basic principles.
The Court also reasoned that the executive should have broad foreign affairs
powers since discretion was needed given the inherent delicacy with which matters
of foreign affairs must be handled.88 The Court didn’t want to limit what the president could do regarding his or her relationship with a foreign government because to
do so would violate the sovereignty of the national government.89 It is highly doubtful that either the founders of our constitution or the Court in Curtiss-Wright would
have every conceived of the scenario we find ourselves in today. That the states
would actively seek to undermine the executive in diplomacy, foreign affairs, and
even treaty making would have been absurd. It would have seemed like a self-defeating exercise since the federal government naturally speaks on behalf of the states.
While the current administration may not engender the same level of loyalty that the
country is used to, there is nonetheless a responsibility to defer to the executive
branch.
Heavily used as justification for presidential action in the Bush administration,
Curtiss-Wright still remains good law. When President Bush’s government was criticized for their policies on detained actors suspected of terrorism, the administration
generally responded back with claims that they had authority from the Curtiss-Wright
Doctrine.90 While the Supreme Court generally refused to apply the Curtiss-Wright
Doctrine to the detainment of citizens, the statute was still upheld for analysis. The
83 Id.
84 299 U.S. 304,319 (1936).
85 Id. at 311.
86 Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1659.
(1997).
87 Id. at 1660–61.
88 Carolyn A. Pytynia, Forgive Me, Founding Fathers for I Have Sinned: A Reconciliation of Foreign
Affairs Preemption After Medellin v. Texas, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 1413, 1416 (2010).
89 Id.
90 Dawn E. Johnsen, “The Essence of a Free Society”: The Executive Powers Legacy of Justice Stevens and the Future of Foreign Affairs Deference, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 467, 476 (2012).
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Court in Curtiss-Wright was likely referring to normal foreign affairs powers, like
the power to negotiate, engage in diplomacy, and make treaties. The Court reasoned
that,
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as
a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.91
D. YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. V. SAWYER
Within the field of foreign affairs, preemption is generally classified into three
categories: direct conflict with a federal position, incidental effect on foreign affairs,
or no conflict.92 The current environment regarding state response to the Paris Agreement falls within the first and second category. The laws are in direct conflict with
the government’s position since they use language explicitly denying the President’s
right to make foreign policy decisions for the whole country. The President can exercise preemption under the foreign affairs power by nature of the fact that he has
made his administration’s policy positions known and available to the public. In
considering foreign affairs preemption, courts will look to the actual impact of the
law. Here, I think it would be plain to say that such legislation actually exists as a
hindrance to American foreign policy.
As an implied power, however, foreign affairs preemption analysis regarding
state activism should be considered the context of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.93 In particular, Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown is helpful in
outlining the general boundaries of executive power in relation to Congress. Three
main scenarios help guide this power balance. The first gives the President the greatest amount of authority when Congress has either explicitly or implicitly authorized
the President’s power. The second is called the “zone of twilight” and applies when
the President acts in the “absence of congressional authorization or denial of his actions.”94 Lastly, the third scenario gives the President the lowest amount of power if
he or she acts contrary to a federal statute. In this case, executive power is “at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”95
The facts of the Youngstown case fell into the third category where the President
was acting within the lowest ebb. President Truman had just issued an Executive
Order authorizing the seizure of a steel mill in order to ensure a steady supply of
materials during the Korean War. The workers at the mill were about to go on strike,
and rather than risk a shortage of steel until the negotiations concluded, President
91 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319.
92 See Sapna Desai, Note, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State Divestment Statutes,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 669 (2009).
93 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
94 Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 637.
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Truman thought it would be more expedient to seize the factory. Claiming that his
actions were constitutional, he acted solely upon the authority of his Article II power,
and the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution did not envision such a powerful
executive.
Considering the current situation of rogue states and political subunits, Justice
Jackson would likely consider the President to be operating with implicit favor from
the legislature considering the historical approval of expanding executive control in
foreign affairs. Over time we have steadily expanded the powers of the President
through the consensus of the legislature. Looking to this expansion should inform
our analysis of implicit approval from Congress. As mentioned earlier in this Note,
the executive has expansive power under Curtiss-Wright to conduct foreign policy,
and Congress has mirrored judicial approval with laws of their own expanding the
power to engage in military action,96 make determinations on embassies and citizenship,97 and organize legal settlements in collaboration with foreign policy objectives.98
Since President Trump is working within Justice Jackson’s first category, his
actions are at their fullest strength and state action conflicting with the federal agenda
should be preempted. Unlike President Truman, who went against the auspice of
Congressional approval and drafted an executive order of unprecedented action outside of a declared state of emergency, President Trump has only engaged in a timetested, traditional power of foreign affairs. Treaty-making and diplomacy are areas
of politics reserved for the executive. There is no zone of twilight, and if the federal
government was to invalidate the statutes passed in Hawaii, Washington, Massachusetts, and Maryland, he could.
Similarly, the federal government could preempt the legislation under the Supremacy Clause of the constitution. There is significantly more information available
about the Supremacy Clause, and while the administration has not issued any laws
preventing ratification of the Paris Agreement, preemption could still occur if the
state law is “inconsistent with the federal law's objectives and undermines uniformity
in foreign affairs.”99 Preemption can occur when Congress expressly preempts the
law, if they implicitly preempt the law by occupying a field, or if a state law is in
conflict with a federal law.100 The field of foreign affairs is occupied by the executive. While Congress has the express power to ratify treaties, declare war, and regulate foreign commerce, it is the executive branch which has the exclusive power to
regulate foreign policy. Ignoring for the moment the question of whether it should
be the executive or legislative branch that should exercise this power, it is undisputed
that it does not naturally belong to the states.

96 Michael D. Ramsey, Exchange: War Powers: Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543,
1548 (2002).
97 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
98 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
99 Sapna Desai, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State Divestment Statutes, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 669, 685 (2009).
100 Id.

120

Journal of Legislation

E.

[Vol. 45:5]

RAMIFICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

In international law, the party on the other side of the deal operates on a subjective basis without requiring any inquiry into the constitutional system of the proposing state. The biggest example of the presumption for constitutionality would be the
international dispute in Denmark v. Norway.101 In that case, the Norwegian Foreign
Minister said that Denmark would not experience any push back from Norway if the
Danes continued to inhabit Greenland. His passive statement was considered to be a
treaty despite the fact that in Norway, the Foreign Minister doesn’t have authority to
bind the entire country.102 Denmark v. Norway was the first time a vague, oral agreement was upheld as a binding contract in international law. The facts would suggest
an inference, at best, that Norway would allow Denmark to have the land, and yet
that was sufficient enough.
Taking into consideration the precedent established by Denmark v. Norway, the
United States would likely lose if a case was brought to the International Court of
Justice. The court would not look into our system of federalism or the precedent
around actual agency in our own common law. While many critics question the utility of international law, the Supreme Court made it clear in The Paquete Habana and
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy that customary international law is part of
American common law and that Congressional statutes should be read as consistent
with international law.103 Therefore, it would be irrelevant that Governor Brown
doesn’t have the constitutional authority to bind the United States—the International
Court of Justice will not conduct an inquiry regarding the constitutionality of his actions. According to international law, the governor’s apparent, subjective authority
is all that matters.
Furthermore, a close look at attribution precedent in international law will show
that it is possible for a political unit to bind the state as a whole even if the other legal
party to the controversy is aware of the constitutional background. There are three
principles outlined for attributing conduct to the state.104 The first and most relevant
for the scope of this debate is that the state acts through people exercising the state’s
machinery of power and authority. This includes the official organs or agents of the
state including political subdivisions. In consideration of the Paris Agreement, a
governor of the state would be considered an “official organ or political subdivision.”105 The second principle gives no attribution for non-state actors like private
persons, mobs, corporations or trade unions, but the third principle attributes agency
when there is failure to act in a scenario that requires state action.
In light of the Geneva Convention on the Law of Treaties, there would also be a

101 See generally Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judgment,
I.C.J. REP. 38 (1993).
102 Id. at 290.
103 See, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also, 2 Cranch 64 (1804).
104 Kevin A. Bove, Attribution Issues in State Responsibility, 84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 51, 52–53
(1990).
105 See generally, Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens,
reprinted in Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of
Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 545, 548 (1961).
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counter-federalist argument as to what exactly the “organs of the state” are defined
as. This could presumably include mayors and governors, but any reviewing court
would look into the subjective nature of the other side’s belief (in this case China,
Russia, or the EU) to determine liability. The question for the court in that case would
be to ask whether it was possible to bind a state in the U.S., but not the country itself
in international law. Considering that other nations like Australia, Switzerland, and
Germany all have political subunits that participate in treaty making and legislation,106 the court will consider it a likelihood. This fact could also support the contention that China was operating under the legitimate assumption that Governor
Brown was constitutionally representing a political subunit.
When deciding the question of state responsibility for diplomatic agreements,
the International Court of Justice does not inquire into the constitutional system of
the country under analysis. Federalism is not an assumed characteristic of the constitutional design of a state, and in fact, many states like Australia, Germany, and
Switzerland allow their political subunits to conduct their own foreign affairs and
develop treaties. When considering the sheer number of political subunits in the
United States that have openly called for ratification of the Paris Agreement within
their own capacity, this could potentially leave the country open to international liability within the International Court of Justice.
Though the Supreme Court’s holding in The Paquete Habanahas been challenged by Justice Neil Gorsuch in his concurrence in Jesner v. Arab Bank,107 his
concurrence is not binding law and only serves to suggest an opening for further discussion on the application of The Paquete Habana.. Practically, this means that despite the fact that every constitutional scholar would agree that a state governor would
not have the power to hold our entire country liable for his or her actions made in an
international setting, the International Court of Justice could find the United States in
breach of its obligations and we would be bound to accept it since The Paquete Habana is still good law. Further, any new legal developments in international treaty
law would bind the United States. This issue could potentially arise if China ever
sought to challenge Governor Brown on the enforcement of the Memorandum of Understanding that they signed in Beijing.
III. IS DIPLOMACY THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT?
A. BACKGROUND ON DIPLOMACY WITH THE INDIVIDUAL AMERICAN STATES
Cultural connections, like the establishment of sister cities, are not considered to
be in conflict with the dormant foreign affairs power of the executive. The reasoning
behind this is because cultural ties, while politically significant in their own right, do
not negatively affect the bargaining power of the executive branch. Recently the
legitimacy of state action in establishing international cultural connections was challenged in a case regarding a Comfort Women Statue in Glendale, California, but the

106 See generally France Morrisette, Provincial Involvement in International Treaty Making: The European Union as a Possible Model, 37 QUEEN’S L. J. 577 (2012).
107 Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S.Ct. 1386, 1412 (2018) (Gorsuch, N., concurring).
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Supreme Court declined to address the issue.108 During WWII, Japanese soldiers
captured, raped, and forced Korean women to be prostitutes in war brothels. The
statute commemorated their inhumane treatment and the dignity they still carry despite a lack of accountability.109 Japanese diplomats said that the statute was harming
relations between the countries and that the cities did not have the power to erect
them. The court disagreed and said that this was a constitutional power.110
The current situation is different from something like the Comfort Women Statue
because these statements and statutes are not cultural claims but rather economic and
political alliances that are at odds with the executive. It would be as if though Glendale passed a divestment statute severing economic ties to Japan instead of allowing
art to be displayed in a public park. Logically, allowing states to establish cultural
connections would help with the public image of the United States and perhaps even
serve to reinforce American diplomacy without the risk of infringing upon the “one
voice” policy.
CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS
The actions of the governors, mayors, and state legislatures are likely unconstitutional, and if we want to prevent a dangerous precedent of rogue states from departing from federal foreign policy, the courts should prohibit these actions. While
the states of Hawaii, Washington, Massachusetts, and Maryland have been the first
to pass legislation regarding the Paris Agreement, it is unlikely that they will be the
last. In fact, it is part of the mission statement for organizations like the Climate
Alliance to encourage other states to follow their lead. All of the states that have
passed this legislation are part of the Climate Alliance, so it can be expected that they
will supplement their legislation with encouragement.
The statutes violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine because along with going against expressed foreign policy from the Trump administration, they effectively
seek to ratify the Paris Agreement as if they were independent political actors. While
these states claim that they have a vested and significant interest in maintaining low
carbon emissions, this interest is not enough to justify direct conflict with the federal
government. States generally have the ability to skirt the grounds of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine when they are legislating in an area traditionally left under
the responsibility of the state, but that is not the case regarding diplomacy and foreign
affairs. The federal government has always had exclusive domain over appointments
of ambassadors, foreign affairs, diplomacy, treaty making, and any general agreement with a foreign nation. While states have the power to engage in cultural exchange, like that of applying to be a “sister city,” this is not political, but rather a
cultural connection unregulated by the foreign government.
In particular, courts look to the effect that the legislation has had on the federal
government’s ability to conduct foreign affairs, and in this case, President Trump has
108 Agnes Constante, Supreme Court Declines Case Over Lawsuit to Remove “Comfort Women” Memorial, NBC News (Mar. 31, 2017, 9:57 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/supreme-court-declines-case-over-lawsuit-remove-comfort-women-memorial-n740996.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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been severely limited in his ability to engage the European Union and other allies on
the topic of re-entry of the Paris Agreement. Here, we are seeing the effect of violating the “one voice” policy. How can the President re-negotiate for entry if he is being
undermined by factions within our own country? The legislation and participation in
international conferences all signal to the world that the United States does not have
“one voice” but is instead a raucous crowd with competing opinions.
There is a public policy interest in preventing the states from setting their own
foreign affairs agenda, because not only does it undermine the authority of the government of the United States, but it also undermines their own expressed interests.
For example, if the states who joined the Climate Alliance truly want to see American
involvement in the Paris Agreement, then attempts to undermine the executive’s bargaining position will only serve to limit the possibility of re-joining.
While the actions of the states and actors mentioned above are unconstitutional
and should be challenged by the federal government, they also pose a threat in the
international sphere. According to customary international law, of which is part of
American common law, if a government representative enters into a legally binding
agreement, they will bind their government if the receiving country views that representative as having apparent authority. When Governor Jerry Brown went to China
and signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Chinese President Xi Jinping, his
actions were perceived as legally binding. In Chinese law, Memoranda of understanding are as legally binding as formal contracts in our system, so the question
remains as to whom he was binding.
If China wanted to take us to the International Criminal Court in order to enforce
Governor Brown’s actions, they would likely win with reliance under established
precedent from Denmark v. Norway. In that case, the Norwegian Foreign Minister
made it seem like they were conceding land, and while there was no mention of a
contract nor were there any definitive words of acceptance mentioned, it was still
binding. So, it is important to tease out the difference between a Foreign Minister
and a state Governor.
While it is not immediately apparent that the Chinese President would be acting
under a reasonable assumption that a Governor has the power to bind a nation, especially considering the limiting language employed in the MOU, he might have a legitimate assumption that the MOU has the power to bind California as a state. This
is unconstitutional because in the American system, states cannot be bound in international agreements regarding foreign affairs, but an international court is under no
obligation to inquire after the constitutional system of its prospective litigants. The
hypothetical international court would make the argument that such actions would be
presumed constitutional.
Practically, if we were taken to the International Court of Justice to argue against
a claim that a subunit of our government is internationally liable, it would likely spark
intense disagreement within the United States. Medellin would be an effective example of when the United States did not accept an International Court of Justice provisional ruling and decided instead to act independently. In that case, the Department
of Justice filed an amicus brief suggesting that the ruling was optional and encouraged Texas to follow through with their criminal proceedings. President Bush tried

124

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 45:5]

to intervene, claiming that the foreign affairs power of the President under CurtissWright allowed him to force Texas to wait on carrying out their execution sentence
against the foreign national. However, Texas responded with the contention that
criminal law is an area that was traditionally left to the complete regulation by the
state, and though the executive has extensive foreign affairs powers, that was not one
of them. By contrast, legislating on foreign affairs and traveling abroad to conduct
diplomacy is not a historically protected area in which states have exclusive power.
The Trump Administration has had very negative relations with many of the
states under analysis that have set out to promote the Paris Agreement, and while it
may be difficult to put aside such grudges, it is often necessary. While partisanship
is sometimes inevitable, it should not be at the risk of our entire system of government. Scholars may argue against the expanse of the president’s power and the extent
to which it is the executive or the legislature that has the primary responsibility of
regulating foreign affairs, but that we have a strong system of federalism has not been
a serious contention since the Antebellum Period.
We must encourage reliance on the federalist system lest we suffer the same pitfalls as the Continental Congress. There was a reason why the post-war currency
was volatile, trade was confusing, and why our citizens suffered inconsistent taxes—
the lack of leadership from a unitary executive. Drawing away from the political
backdrop inevitable in such a discussion, what would commentators say if individual
states started levying tariffs against countries the dislike? Hypothetically, if California started levying tariffs against Saudi Arabia and penalizing all companies associated with Saudi Arabia, the response would be strongly against such actions. The
reasoning behind California’s decision making would not matter because that is
simply not their role.
Climate change is a legitimate and dangerous risk to our standard of living, water
supply, and long-term inhabitance on this planet, but it is not enough to say that the
threat to an individual state is enough to ignore the constitutional safeguards evident
in the American constitution and jurisprudence. Unlike cultural overtures, foreign
affairs are solely within the province of the federal government. In our history, there
has been no recorded time where a state has sent diplomats abroad or contracted with
foreign allies at the direct expense of the federal government’s foreign policy. This
is not to say that states cannot criticize the government, as is done in healthy political
discourse, but to embrace terms like “shadow delegation” and the “anti-Trump official” only signals the deterioration of our united government. While presidential administrations may come and go, the bedrock of our democracy rests on a strong adherence to federalism. If states wish to become active against the federal government,
they need not risk the deterioration of our federalist system when there are better
alternatives of political engagement.

